Once the juridical seat is fixed, courts of the seat have exclusive jurisdiction for all arbitration-related proceedings; courts elsewhere — even where the cause of action arose — are ousted.
The Legal Question Before the Court
The arbitration agreement between the parties designated Mumbai as the seat of arbitration. A dispute arose, and one party filed a Section 9 application (interim measures) before a court in Chennai — where part of the contract was performed and where part of the cause of action arose. The question was: which court has jurisdiction to entertain Section 9 and other Arbitration Act applications — the court at the designated seat, or any court where the cause of action or part of the cause of action arose?
The Court's Decision
The court held that the designation of Mumbai as the seat of arbitration was, in effect, an exclusive jurisdiction clause. The courts of Mumbai (the seat) alone had jurisdiction to entertain Section 9 applications, Section 34 petitions, and all other proceedings under Part I of the Arbitration Act. The courts of Chennai — notwithstanding the fact that part of the cause of action arose there — were ousted of jurisdiction.
The court reasoned that the seat is akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause for all arbitration-related proceedings. Section 42 of the Arbitration Act provides that the court that first becomes seized of a matter shall have exclusive jurisdiction over subsequent applications under that Act. But where a seat is designated, that court has exclusive jurisdiction from the outset, without requiring any prior application to fix it.
The Court's Reasoning
The bench drew an analogy between an arbitration seat clause and an exclusive jurisdiction clause in a contract. Just as parties can agree that only the courts of a particular city shall have jurisdiction over disputes arising from a contract, they can agree (expressly or by designating a seat) that only the courts of the seat city shall supervise the arbitration. Section 20 of the Arbitration Act permits the parties to agree on the place of arbitration; once agreed, that place is the seat.
The court rejected the argument that "ordinary original civil jurisdiction" under Section 2(1)(e) of the Act allowed any court within whose territorial limits part of the cause of action arose to exercise jurisdiction. In arbitration, the seat selection is the operative jurisdictional choice — it supersedes the cause-of-action test.
Practical Implications — What This Means Today
Indus Mobile has direct practical consequences for arbitration filing strategy. A party seeking Section 9 interim relief must file before the court at the seat — even if the assets to be attached are located elsewhere, and even if the cause of action arose elsewhere. Filing in the wrong court results in dismissal for want of jurisdiction.
This ruling also has implications for the drafting of arbitration clauses. A well-drafted clause should specify the seat clearly — distinguishing it, if necessary, from the venue for hearings. An ambiguous clause — or one that designates a venue without specifying a seat — invites jurisdictional disputes that delay the commencement of arbitral proceedings and the availability of interim relief.
Relevant Statutory Provisions
- Section 9, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Interim measures — jurisdiction of court at seat
- Section 20, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Place of arbitration — party agreement
- Section 42, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Jurisdiction — court first seized has exclusive jurisdiction
- Section 2(1)(e), Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Definition of "Court" in the context of arbitration
Analysis by Vinode V. Luka, Advocate | Published: May 2026 | Last reviewed: May 2026